Abstract. Let R be the least ordinal such that L (R) is admissible. Let A = fx 2 R j (9 < R ) s.t. x is ordinal de nable in L (R) g. It is well known that (assuming determinacy) A is the largest countable inductive set of reals. Let T be the theory: ZFC Replacement + \There exists ! Woodin cardinals which are co nal in the ordinals." T has consistency strength weaker than that of the theory ZFC + \There exists ! Woodin cardinals", but stronger than that of the theory ZFC + \There exists n Woodin Cardinals", for each n 2 !. Let M be the canonical, minimal inner model for the theory T. In this paper we show that A = R\ M. Since M is a mouse, we say that A is a mouse set. As an application, we use our characterization of A to give an inner-model-theoretic proof of Martin's theorem that A is equal to the set of reals which are n for some n.
determined (AD L(R) ), we have: A = x 2 R (9 < ! 1 ) x 2 ( 2 1 ) L(R) ( ) ; and A is the largest countable ( 2 1 ) L(R) set of reals.
In the paper \Inner Models with Many Woodin Cardinals" St2], Steel and Woodin prove the following theorem:
Theorem 0.2 (Steel, Woodin) . Suppose that there are ! Woodin cardinals with a mea- Theorems 0.1 and 0.2 are obviously similar to each other. Let us establish some terminology which will allow us to describe this similarity. Given a pointclass let us set: A = f x 2 R j (9 < ! 1 ) x 2 ( ) g : Theorems 0.1 and 0.2 both establish results of the form: A is a mouse set. Theorem 0.1 does this for = 1 n . Theorem 0.2 does this for = ( 2 1 ) L(R) . Furthermore, the two theorems do not merely show that there exists some mouse M such that A = R \ M.
The theorems actually describe M in terms of the large cardinal axioms that it satis es.
There is quite a bit of room between theorems 0.1 and 0.2. One way to describe this room is in terms of the levels of the model L(R). For convenience, we will use the Jensen J-hierarchy for L(R). We de ne J 1 (R) to be R HF. For a limit ordinal we set J (R) = S < J (R). For 1 we set J +1 (R) to be the rudimentary closure of J (R) fJ (R)g. Then L(R) = S J (R). See St1] or Ru] for a more detailed discussion. Now let = ( 2 1 ) L(R) be the least ordinal such that J (R) is a 1 elementary submodel of L(R). Then we can characterize the room between theorems 0.1 and 0.2 by pointing out that the rst theorem is concerned with the pointclasses n (J 1 (R)), and the second theorem is concerned with the pointclass 1 (J (R)). Assuming AD L(R) , is a large cardinal in L(R) (for example it is an inaccessible limit of inaccessibles.) From this point of view there is quite a bit of room between theorems 0.1 and 0.2.
Given the above discussion, it is natural to conjecture that A is a mouse set for = n (J (R)), for all and all n. In Ru] we do make such a conjecture (in a slightly more precise formulation.) In that paper we are not able to fully prove the conjecture, but we are able to prove the conjecture for some and some n. Our main theorem in Ru] is similar to theorems 0.1 and 0.2 above in that we not only show that there exists some mouse M such that A = R \ M, we actually describe M in terms of the large cardinal axioms which it satis es. Independently, and using entirely di erent techniques, Woodin has shown that A is a mouse set for = 1 (J (R)), for all limit ordinals . See St4]. Woodin's proof shows only that there exists some mouse M such that A = R\M.
The mouse M is not described in terms of the large cardinal axioms which it satis es. Now we turn to the topic of the current paper. In this paper we will show that A is a mouse set, for = the pointclass of hyperprojective sets. (See below for the de nition of hyperprojective.) Assuming determinacy, A is the largest countable inductive set. Thus there are obvious parallels between our result, and the results of theorems 0.1 and 0.2 above. We may also compare our result with those of theorems 0.1 and 0.2 by looking at levels of L(R). Another way of describing the main result of this paper is to say that we will show that A is a mouse set, for = 1 (J (R)), where = R is the least ordinal such that J (R) is admissible. Since 1 < R < ( 2 1 ) L(R) , the result of this paper is strictly between those of theorem 0.1 and and theorem 0.2 above.
We will feel free to use terms and concepts from inner model theory. In particular, we will expect the reader to have some familiarity with the papers MiSt] and St2].
Some of the research for this paper was done while I was a graduate student at UCLA, although the results do not appear in my PhD thesis. I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor John Steel.
The Pointclass of Inductive Sets
The pointclass of inductive sets has several di erent equivalent descriptions. (Throughout this paper we shall only be using the term \inductive" in the lightface sense. This is what is called \absolutely inductive" in Mo].) In section 7C of Mo] the inductive sets are de ned as the positive analytical inductive sets on R. It is shown there that the class of all inductive sets is the smallest Spector pointclass which is closed under both 8 R and 9 R . The compliment of an inductive set is called co-inductive. If X is both inductive and co-inductive then we say that X is hyperprojective. As we shall not have any need for the concept of \positive analytical inductive," we shall not go into any more detail about it here. Instead we give two other equivalent characterizations of the inductive sets.
De nition 0.3. R is the least ordinal so that J (R) is admissible.
For convenience we make the following convention.
Notation 0.4. For the rest of the paper will refer exclusively to R .
A set X R is inductive i X is 1 de nable over the model J (R), with the point R as a parameter. As we shall always allow the point R as a parameter in de nitions over the models J (R), we suppress mention of it in our notation. Thus we write that X is inductive i X is 1 (J (R)). (See St1] or Ru] for a more detailed discussion of de nability over the models J (R).) Similarly, X is co-inductive i X is 1 (J (R)) and x is hyperprojective i X is 1 (J (R)).
De nition 0.5. A HYP = the set of all x 2 R such that (9 < R ) so that x is de nable over J (R) from ordinal parameters.
It is not di cult to see that x 2 A HYP i fxg is 1 (J (R);f g), for some ordinal , i fxg is 1 (J (R); f g). Assuming determinacy A HYP is countable, and so we may take to be a countable ordinal. Thus A HYP is what we were above calling A , for = the pointclass of hyperprojective sets. Also assuming determinacy, it is not di cult to see that A HYP is the largest countable inductive set.
In this paper we will show that A HYP is a mouse set, that is that A HYP = R \ M for some mouse M. There are two halves to this proof. In section 1 we use a comparison argument to show that R \ M A HYP , and in section 2 we prove a correctness theorem which implies that A HYP R \ M.
Let 0 = the class of unions of inductive and coinductive sets. Let n be the class of complements of n sets and let n+1 be the class of projections of n sets. Equivalently, n = n+1 (J (R)), for n 1. (To see this use the fact that J (R) projects to R. See St1] .) In Ma2], Martin shows that A HYP is equal to the set of reals which are n for some n. In section 3 we reprove one direction of Martin's theorem using purely inner-modeltheoretic techniques. Using our characterization of A HYP as R \ M for some premouse M, we show that every n real x is in A HYP by showing that x 2 M.
We shall need one other characterization of the inductive sets: A set A R is inductive i A is a R -open. That is i there is a function x 7 ! G x such that for all reals x, x 2 A $ player I wins G x , where G x is an open game on R which is continuously associated to x. More precisely, A is inductive i there is some arithmetic set P ! <! (! <! ) <! such that x 2 A i (9y 1 2 R)(8y 2 2 R)(9y 3 2 R) (9n 2 !) P(x n; y 1 n; y 2 n; : : :; y n n):
Similarly, A is co-inductive i A is a R -closed.
Fairly Small Premice
In this paper we will show that A HYP is a mouse set. We shall not only show that there exists some mouse M such that A HYP = R\M, we shall describe M in terms of the large cardinal axioms which it satis es. By examining theorems 0.1 and 0.2 above, we can see that M must satisfy a large cardinal axiom which is stronger than ZFC + \there exists n Woodin cardinals", for each n, but weaker than ZFC + \there exists ! Woodin cardinals". To obtain the large cardinal axiom which M will satisfy, we start with the hypothesis ZFC + \there exists ! Woodin cardinals", and we remove the assumption that there are any ordinals above the supremum of the ! Woodin cardinals.
The mice used in section 4 of St2] are called !-small. The mice used in St3] are called n-small. We need a notion which ts between these two notions. Without any thought as to its use beyond this paper, we will adopt the term fairly small. St3] , we will de ne a weakening of the notion of full iterability which is simply de nable, and yet is strong enough to compare fairly small premice. Our weakened notion of iterability is best described using the notion of an iteration game. In section 1 of St2], Steel de nes WG n (M; ), the n-maximal, weak iteration game on M, of length . For our purposes here, we will need a slight modi cation of the game WG 0 (M; !). The set f M j II wins WG 0 (M; !) g is a R -1 1 . We need a notion of iterability which is a R -closed. Below we de ne an iteration game called the closed iteration game on M.
Let M be a countable, premouse. The closed iteration game on M is identical to WG 0 (M; !), except that if neither player loses during the rst ! rounds of play, then we automatically declare that player II has won. That is, we do not demand that the direct limit model be de ned and wellfounded in order for player II to win. Thus the game is essentially a game on R with closed payo for player II. Here are the rules of the closed iteration game in more detail: The game is played in ! rounds. Before beginning round n < ! we have a premouse M n , and an integer k n such that M n is k n -sound. We get started by setting M 0 = M and k 0 = 0. Round n is played as follows. Player I begins by playing a countable, putative k n -maximal iteration tree T on M n . Player II can then either accept T or play a maximal well-founded branch b of T, with the proviso that he cannot accept T if it has a last, ill-founded model. If it is impossible for II to play then he loses at round n. Suppose that II does not lose at round n. If II acceptss T, then we let M n+1 be the last model of T. If II picks a maximal wellfounded branch b of T, then we set M n+1 = M T b . In either case we let k n+1 be the degree of M n+1 in T. If II does not lose at any round n < ! then II wins.
De nition 1.1. Let M be a countable premouse. Then M is a R -closed iterable i player II wins the closed iteration game on M.
Remark 1.2. The set of (reals coding) premice M such that player II wins the closed iteration game on M is a a a R -closed set. In other words the set is coinductive. In other words the set is 1 (J (R)).
Let M and N be countable premice. We say that M and N can be compared i there is a countable iteration tree T on M of length + 1 and a countable iteration tree U on N of length + 1 such that either The main result in this section says that if M is fully iterable and fairly small, and N is a R -closed iterable, then M and N can be compared. To see that our comparison process terminates, we will need a certain amount of generic absoluteness. We will get the generic absoluteness we need by assuming that there exists in nitely many Woodin cardinals in V , and then using the machinery of Woodin's stationary tower forcing. See Chapter 9 of Ma1] for a thorough treatment of this machinery. Below we simply quote one fact from the theory of stationary tower forcing. Proposition 1.3 (Woodin) . Let h n j n 2 !i be a strictly increasing sequence of Woodin cardinals. Let = sup n n . Let > be any ordinal. Then there is a generic extension of the universe, V G], such that in V G] there is an elementary embedding j : V ! Ult such that (i) is in the wellfounded part of Ult, (ii) crit(j) = ! V 1 , and j(! V 1 ) = , and (iii) letting R be the reals of Ult, we have that R is also the set of reals in a symmetric collapse of V up to .
See section 9.5 of Ma1] for a proof of this proposition. Now we turn to the main result in this section. Proof. The proof of Theorem 1.10 from St2] shows this. We will give a sketch of the details. In the language of that proof, when comparing M with N, when more than one co nal realizable branch appears on the M-side, or more than one co nal a R -closed iterable branch appears on the N-side, we dovetail in a new comparison which guarantees that a certain ordinal is Woodin in the common \lined up part" of the family of models we are comparing. Thus every time we dovetail in a new comparison, we get another Woodin cardinal. Suppose we had to dovetail in a new comparison in nitely many times. Since M is realizable, on the M side we have a wellfounded direct limit model M 0 . Because we had to dovetail in a new comparison in nitely many times, in M 0 there are in nitely many ordinals which are Woodin. Thus M 0 is not fairly small. But this contradicts our assumption that M is fairly small. Thus we did not have to dovetail in a new comparison in nitely many times.
In the proof of Theorem 1.10 from St2], we would then be in Case 2 of the proof of the Claim. That is, we still need to see that our comparison does not last for ! 1 stages. Suppose that our comparison does last for ! 1 stages. Let T on M and U on N be the trees of length ! 1 which are generated by the comparison. We can derive the usual contradiction if we can show that there is a co nal branch b of T and a co nal branch c of U. Since M is realizable, the proof of Theorem 1.10 shows that there is a co nal branch b of T. To see that there is a co nal branch c of U, we will need to use our hypothesis that there exists ! Woodin cardinals in V . Let be the supremum of the ! Woodin cardinals.
Let R 0 be the set of reals in some symmetric collapse of V up to . Then there is some ordinal such that J (R 0 ) is admissible. Let 0 be the least such ordinal. Since the collapse forcing is homogeneous, 0 does not depend on our particular choice of R 0 .
Let > 0 be any ordinal. Recall that we have set = R . Let j : V ! Ult be as in Proposition 1.3 above. Let R be the reals of Ult. By Proposition 1.3, R is also the set of reals in a symmetric collapse of V up to . Thus 0 is the least such that J (R ) is admissible. Now 0 is in the wellfounded part of Ult. So Ult j =\ 0 is the least such that J (R) is admissible." Thus j( ) = 0 . Now j(U) is an iteration tree on N which properly extends U. By case hypothesis, there is some ordinal < ! 1 such that for all with < < ! V 1 , U has a unique, co nal, a R -closed iterable branch. (Otherwise we would have had to dovetail in a new comparison ! 1 times.) Since a R -closed = 1 (J (R)) and j : J (R) ! J 0 (R ) is fully elementary, we have that for all with < < ! J 0 (R ) 1 , j(U) has a unique, co nal branch that is a R -closed iterable in J 0 (R ). Since j(U) ! V 1 = U, there is a co nal branch c of U which is de nable in L(R ) from U and 0 . As the collapse forcing is homogeneous, c 2 V . Corollary 1.6. Assume that there exists ! Woodin cardinals. Let M be a countable, realizable, fairly small premouse. Then every real in M is ordinal de nable over J (R), for some < R .
Proof. Fix a real x in M. Let be the rank of x in the order of construction of M. We will show that x is de nable from . Notice that x is the unique real x 0 such that:
there exists a countable, fairly small, a R -closed iterable premouse N such that x 0 2 N and x 0 is the th real in the order of construction of N.
(proof: M witnesses that the statement above is true of the real x. Suppose that N witnessed that the statement above was true of some other real x 0 . By our Comparison Lemma, M and N can be compared. This implies that x 0 = x.) Since 1 (J (R)) is closed under real quanti cation, we have that fxg is 1 (J (R); ). Fix a 1 formula ' such that x is the unique real x 0 so that J (R) j = :' x 0 ; ; R]. Let f : R ! R be de ned by: f(x) = 0, and for y 6 = x, f(y) = the least < R such that J (R) j = ' y; ; R]. Notice that f is 1 (J (R); f ; xg). Thus the range of f is not co nal in R . Let = sup(ran(f)). Then x is the unique real x 0 such that J (R) j = :' x 0 ; ; R]. Thus x is ordinal de nable over J (R).
Inductive Correctness
In this section we will complete the proof that A HYP is a mouse set. We will show that if M is iterable and fairly big, then A HYP R \ M. We will need to use Woodin's stationary tower forcing. See chapter 9 of Ma1] for a thorough treatment of stationary tower forcing.
De nition 2.1. Let be a limit ordinal. Then Q is the \Q-version" of the stationary tower forcing up to . More speci cally, x 2 Q i x 2 V and x is a stationary set and every element of x is countable. The ordering on Q is described in chapter 9 of Ma1].
We will need to use the following technical fact about the Q . We shall use heavily a result due to H. Woodin concerning genericity over L Ẽ ] models. This result is often referred to as \iterating to make a real generic." We state the result here in the form in which we shall need it. The following is also Theorem 4.3 from St2].
Lemma 2.4 (Woodin). Let M be a countable, realizable, premouse. Suppose < < OR M . Suppose M j = \ is a Woodin cardinal." Let P J M be a partial order in M and let G be M-generic over P. Then there is a partial order Q J M , with Q 2 M, such that for any real w, there is an iteration tree T on M of countable length + 1 such that (a) M T is realizable, and (b) D T = ; so that i T 0; is de ned, and (c) crit(E T ) > for all < (so G is M T -generic over P), and
For an idea of how to prove this lemma, see the exercises at the end of chapters 6 and 7 in Ma1].
Our next two results will say that if a premouse M has ! Woodin cardinals co nal in its ordinals, then M is, in a certain sense, 1 (J (R))-correct. The following is the main technical lemma in this section. Our proof of this lemma is very similar to, and owes its main idea to Steel's proof of Corollary 4.7 in St2]. In that proof, steel iterates a premouse M, yielding a premouse M 0 , with the property that every real in V is generic over M 0 .
Steel then takes a generic ultrapower of M 0 yielding an embedding j : M 0 ! Ult, with the property that R Ult = R V . Now Ult will in general not be wellfounded, but because of the large cardinals in M 0 Steel can arrange that the ordinal height of the wellfounded part of Ult is as large as he wants. (Steel assumes that M has ! Woodin cardinals, plus another extender above the ! Woodin cardinals.) This allows Steel to re ect any 1 truth in L(R) down to M 0 , and hence down to M. In our setting, we are only assuming that M has ! Woodin cardinals co nal in its ordinals. We will therefore not be able to arrange that the ordinal height of the wellfounded part of Ult is as large as we want. Instead, we will only be able to quote abstract admissibility theory to conclude that the ordinal height of the wellfounded part of Ult is at least R . This will allow us to re ect 1 truth from J (R) down to M 0 , and hence down to M.
Lemma 2.5. Let M be a countable, realizable, meek premouse. Suppose that 1 < 2 < 3 < is an increasing !-sequence of ordinals such that each i is a Woodin cardinal of M, and the i are co nal in the ordinals of M. Let P be any partial order in J M 1 and suppose that H is M-generic over P, with H 2 V . Let R = R\ M H]. Then there is an ordinal < 1 such that whenever x 2 R and ' is a 1 formula and J (R) j = ' x; R], then J (R ) j = ' x; R ].
Proof. Fix an ordinal < 1 such that P 2 J M . Let Coll(!; 2 @ 0 ) be the partial order which collapses 2 @ 0 to be countable. For the rest of the proof we work in a generic extension of V via this partial order. Let x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; : : : be an !-enumeration of the reals of V .
We are going to iterate M to yield a new premouse M 0 with the property that every real of V is generic over M 0 H]. More speci cally, we are going to de ne a sequence of mice: M 0 ; M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : with M 0 = M, and a commutative system of embeddings j n;m : M n ! M m , with the property that crit(j 0;n ) > so that H is M n -generic over P, and a sequence of partial orders Q 1 ; Q 2 ; Q 3 ; : : : such that for each n 1, Q n 2 M n H], and a sequence of generic objects G 1 ; G 2 ; G 3 ; : : : such that for each n 1, G n is M n H]-generic over Q n . We will arrange that for each n 1, x n 2 M n H] G n ]. We will maintain inductively that every nite initial segment of our construction lives in V . The whole construction will not live in V . Then we will de ne M 0 to be the direct limit of the M n .
Given such a construction, let 2n = j 0;n ( 2n ). We will also arrange that:
, and crit(j n;m ) > 2n . Thus if m > n then we will have that G n is M m H]-generic over Q n . Finally, we will arrange that if m > n then G m \ Q n = G n .
We begin by setting M 0 = M. Now, working in V and using Lemma 2. The nth step of the construction for n > 2 is similar to the second step of the construction. It is easy to see how to continue the construction so as to obtain a sequence of mice M 0 ; M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : , a commutative system of embeddings j n;m : M n ! M m , a sequence of partial orders Q 1 ; Q 2 ; Q 3 ; : : :, and a sequence of generic lters G 1 ; G 2 ; G 3 ; : : : as described above. Letting 2n = j 0;n ( 2n ) we have, in summary, the following:
(1) crit(j 0;n ) > so H is M n -generic over P.
for n 1. (3) G n is M n H]-generic over Q n , for n 1.
(4) x n 2 M n H] G n ], for n 1.
(5) For 1 n < m, crit(j n;m ) > 2n so G n is M m H]-generic over Q n .
(6) For 1 n < m, G m \ Q n = G n . (7) For n 0, M n H] G n ] 2 V . Let M 0 be the direct limit of the M n under the j n;m . It is obvious that M 0 is wellfounded, because every thread in the direct limit system is eventually constant. Let j : M ! M 0 be the direct limit map. The following facts follow easily from (1) through (7) above:
It follows from (e) and (f) above that
Our next step is to form the generic ultrapower of M 0 H] via the G n s. Let P n = Ult(M 0 H]; G n ). Since 2n is a Woodin cardinal of M 0 H], by Chapter 9 of Ma1], P n is wellfounded. Also, by by Chapter 9 from Ma1], R \ P n = R \ M 0 H] G n ]. Let i n : M 0 H] ! P n be the ultrapower embedding. Then i n is a co nal, 0 -embedding. For 1 n < m, let k n;m : P n ! P m be the canonical embedding. That is:
Then the k n;m form a commutative system of embeddings. Also, for each n < m, i m = k n;m i n . Let P be the direct limit of the P n under the k n;m embeddings. Let k n : P n ! P be the direct limit map. Also let i : M 0 H] ! P be the induced map. We may think of P as being the ultrapower of M 0 H] via S n G n , and we may think of i as the ultrapower embedding. Now P will, in general, not be wellfounded. Let us identify the wellfounded part of P with the transitive set to which it is isomorphic. It is easy to see that R P = S n R \ P n = R V . It follows from general admissibility theory that the rank of the wellfounded part of P is at least R . Now x a real x 2 R , and x a 1 formula ' such that J (R) j = ' x; R]. Then there is a < R such that J (R) j = ' x; R]. Since is in the wellfounded part of P, P satis es the following 1 sentence:
There is an ordinal such that J (R) j = ' x; R] and for all , J (R) is not admissible. Since i is a co nal 0 embedding, M 0 H] also satis es this sentence. Fix a name _ x in M 0 such that x = _ x H . Since crit(j) > we may pick _ x so that it is xed by j. Let p 2 H be such that in M 0 , p forces the statement:
There is an ordinal such that J (R) j = ' _ Since J (R ) is not admissible for all , we have that is less than, for instance, (2 @ 0 ) + M H] . This completes the proof of the lemma. For the ordinal mentioned in the statement of the lemma we can take, say, = ( ++ ) M The previous Lemma gave us an such that 1 (J (R)) goes down to J (R ). The next corollary says that can be chosen so that 1 (J (R)) also goes up.
Corollary 2.6. Under the hypotheses of the previous Lemma, there is an ordinal < 1 such that whenever x 2 R and ' is a 1 formula then J (R) 
Proof. Let 0 be given by the previous lemma. If 0 does not satisfy our corollary, then there is some 1 formula ' , and some x 2 R such that J 0 (R ) j = ' x; R ], and J (R) 6 j = ' x; R]. Let 0 be least such that there is some 1 formula ' , and some x 2 R such that J (R ) j = ' x; R ], and J (R) 6 j = ' x; R]. Then is a successor ordinal.
Let 1 be such that = 1 + 1. We claim that 1 witnesses that our corollary is true.
So let ' by any 1 formula and let x 2 R . If J 1 (R ) j = ' x; R ], then by de nition of , J (R) j = ' x; R]. Conversely, suppose that J (R) j = ' x; R]. Fix y 2 R , and x a 1 formula so that J (R ) j = y; R ] but J (R) 6 j = y; R]. Then J (R) satis es the following 1 statement about hx; yi:
There is an ordinal such that J (R) j = ' x; R] and J (R) 6 j = y; R]. Thus J 0 (R ) satis es the same statement about hx; yi. So there is an ordinal < 0 such that J (R ) j = ' x; R ], and J (R ) 6 j = y; R ]. Since J (R ) j = y; R ], we have that 1 . Thus J 1 (R ) j = ' x; R ]. Corollary 2.7. Let M be a countable, realizable, meek premouse. Suppose that 1 < 2 < 3 < is an increasing !-sequence of ordinals such that each i is a Woodin cardinal of M, and the i are co nal in the ordinals of M. Let x be a real and suppose that for some < R , x is ordinal de nable over J (R) . Then x 2 M. is fairly small. Then the reals of M are exactly equal to the set of reals x such that x is ordinal de nable over J (R), for some < R .
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 1.6 on page 10, and Corollary 2.7 above.
Remark 2.9. Assume that there are ! Woodin cardinals. It is shown in St2] that this implies that there is a proper class premouse L Ẽ ] which satis es ZFC +\There are ! Woodin cardinals." Let M be the E-least initial segment of L Ẽ ] which is fairly big. It is easy to see that M projects to !. M is thus the unique fully iterable premouse which is sound, projects to !, has ! Woodin cardinals co nal in its ordinals, and has the property that every proper initial segment is fairly small. We may think of M as the canonical, minimal inner model for the theory: ZFC Replacement + \There exists ! Woodin cardinals co nal in the ordinals." The previous theorem says that A HYP = R \ M.
3. n Correctness: A Proof of Martin's Theorem In the previous section we showed that A HYP = R \ M, where M is the canonical, minimal inner model for the theory ZFC Replacement + \There are ! Woodin cardinals co nal in the ordinals." In this section we give one application of this characterization of A HYP . We show that every real x which is de nable over J (R) is in A HYP . We do this by showing that x 2 M. Thus we are giving a purely inner-model-theoretic proof of Martin's theorem that every n real is in the largest countable inductive set. The reason that the real x is in M is that for each n 2 !, M can compute n (J (R)) truth. This correctness result for M is the main content of this section.
Let M be a countable, realizable premouse such that M is fairly big, but every proper initial segment of M is fairly small. Corollary 2.6 tells us that there is an ordinal in M so that (J (R)) M agrees with J (R) on 1 facts about reals in M. Consider the following question. Is it possible to identify while working in M? The next lemma tells us that the answer is yes.
Lemma 3.1. Assume that there exists ! Woodin cardinals in V . Let M be a countable, realizable premouse such that M is fairly big, but every proper initial segment of M is fairly small. Let be any cardinal of M and suppose that G is M-generic over Coll(!; ), with G 2 V . Let R = R\ M G]. Suppose that 0 2 M is an ordinal such that whenever x 2 R and ' is a 1 formula then J (R) j = ' x; R] i J 0 (R ) j = ' x; R ]. Then 0 is the least 2 M such that there is a wellorder of R which is de nable over J (R ).
Proof. First let us see that there is a wellorder of R which is de nable over J 0 (R ). Every element of R has a G-name in J M . Furthermore J M and G are in J 0 (R ) as they are coded by elements of R . So it su ces to see that there is a wellorder of J M which is de nable over J 0 (R ). Let < be the order of construction in M. We claim that < J M is de nable over J 0 (R ). Let be a 1 formula such that for all w 2 R, J (R) j = w; R] i w codes a countable premouse N w , and N w is a R -closed iterable. It follows from our comparison theorem, Lemma 1.5 on page 9, that for x; y 2 J M , x < y i J 0 (R ) satis es the following statement:
There is a w 2 R such that w; R ], and x; y 2 N w and x is less than y in the order of construction of N w .
So we have shown that there is a wellorder of R which is de nable over J 0 (R ).
To see that 0 is least with this property, we must show that there is no wellorder of R which is in J 0 (R ). By 1 -correctness, it su ces to see that there is no wellorder of R in J (R). But this follows from our assumption that there are ! Woodin cardinals in V . In fact our large cardinal hypothesis implies that every game in J (R) (and more) is determined. proof: Using Woodin's stationary tower forcing as in the end of the proof of our comparison lemma, Lemma 1.5, we get a fully elementary generic embedding The following is the main technical result of this section. The lemma says that if M has ! Woodin cardinals co nal in its ordinals, then M can compute n (J (R)) truth, for every n. Our proof is by induction on n. In order to carry out this inductive proof we need to make the inductive hypothesis uniform in M. Unfortunately, this slightly complicates the statement of the lemma. Lemma 3.2. Assume that there exists ! Woodin cardinals in V . Let n 1, and let ' be a n formula. Then there is another formula = ' such that whenever M is a countable, realizable premouse, and M is fairly big but every proper initial segment of M is fairly small, and is a cardinal of M, and G is M-generic over Coll(!; ), with G 2 V , and 1 ; 2 ; : : : n are Woodin cardinals of M with < 1 < 2 < < n , and R = R \ M G], and x 2 R , then J (R) j = ' x; R] i J M n G] j = x; 1 ; : : :; n 1 ].
Proof. By induction on n. First let n = 1 and let ' be a 1 formula. Next let n > 1 and let ' be a n formula. Let be a n 1 formula so that ' (v Clearly there is such a formula . Let us see that such a works. Proof. Let n 1 be such that, as a subset of !, x is n de nable over J (R) . Then by the previous lemma, x is de nable over J M n from 1 ; : : : ; n 1 , where 1 ; ; n are the rst n Woodin cardinals of M.
Corollary 3.4. Every n real is in the largest countable inductive set.
